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Even after the U.S. economy 
recovers, there are likely to be 
considerable long-term employment 
problems for the disadvantaged. For 
example, even in 2006, when the U.S. 
economy was near a business cycle peak, 
employment rates for less-educated male 
workers were still well below where 
they were 30 years ago. To match less-
educated male employment rates from 
1979, the United States in 2006 would 
have needed to add about 3 million jobs 
(Bartik and Houseman 2008). In addition, 
employment rates of less-educated 
unmarried women in 2006 were still well 
below those of men, even though under 
welfare reform these women are expected 
to work and be self-supporting.
In addition to finding ways of 
expanding job training programs and 
improving educational attainment, we 
need approaches to expanding labor 
demand for disadvantaged workers. 
Studies have shown that if disadvantaged 
workers can be hired for entry-level 
jobs and stay employed for at least six 
months, they gain valuable labor market 
experience, self-confidence, and a better 
reputation with employers, all of which 
increase their long-term employability 
and earnings.
In my 2001 book Jobs for the 
Poor: Can Labor Demand Policies 
Help? (Bartik 2001, chaps. 8 and 
10) I suggest that the United States 
establish a permanent version of a 
program that Minnesota tried in the 
1980s, the MEED program. MEED at 
first stood for Minnesota Emergency 
Employment Development, and later for 
Minnesota Employment and Economic 
Development. 
Under my proposed national version 
of MEED, the federal government would 
provide wage subsidies of up to $8 an 
hour for employers who hire unemployed 
workers referred by local workforce 
agencies for newly created positions. 
For several reasons, the program would 
be a discretionary program administered 
by local workforce agencies. First, this 
would allow the program to be integrated 
with local workforce programs. Second, 
a discretionary program could be 
selective in targeting employers who 
would be most willing to offer good job 
experiences to disadvantaged workers. 
Third, a discretionary program could 
target disadvantaged workers who 
would be good matches for interested 
employers, which would increase the 
effectiveness of the program.
The subsidies would go to newly 
created positions to minimize 
displacement. This program is intended 
to increase total employment rather than 
to substitute disadvantaged workers for 
other workers. 
The wage subsidies would target 
small businesses and small nonprofit 
employers. The evidence suggests that 
these smaller employers may be the most 
responsive to a wage subsidy.  Including 
both for-profit and nonprofit employers 
also allows the program to provide a wide 
variety of job experiences, and to provide 
both private and public services.
The wage subsidies would fund up to 
six months of labor market experience. 
Employers would be encouraged to roll 
over those hired into permanent job slots. 
Employers that abused the wage subsidy 
system would be excluded from future 
subsidies.
Evidence from the MEED program 
suggests that such a program can 
be successfully run on a large scale. 
Furthermore, studies find that about 
half of the jobs subsidized would not 
have been created but for MEED. The 
program was run in Minnesota on a scale 
that would be equivalent to having about 
600,000 annual participants on a national 
level (Rode 1988).
A program run at a similar level 
nationally in the United States might 
cost about $8 billion a year. This would 
include both the cost of the wage 
subsidy and the costs of various types 
of job training and social support for 
disadvantaged workers who are hired. 
The long-term effects of this program 
should be regularly monitored through 
a performance-monitoring system. This 
system would track the postprogram 
employment and earnings history of 
program participants, compared to similar 
nonparticipants.
The research literature on wage 
subsidies suggests that such a program 
may have long-term effects. Perhaps 
20 percent of the extra employment 
experience of program participants in 
the short run is likely to be reflected in 
increases in long-term employment rates 
of program participants. If run over a 
sustained period, this program has the 
potential to make a substantial dent 
in the depressed employment rates of 
disadvantaged groups.
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